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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I offer a critical examination of modern science with a particular 
stress on the changes that the modern scientific project inaugurated. The focus is how 
modern science has radically changed the way we think about the world. I draw upon 
several  phenomenological thinkers who have considered  the changing nature of 
modern science and its relation to our present day thinking. 
I begin by exploring the key differences between the Ancient Greek and modern 
scientific understanding of mathematics, geometry, and idealisation. Specifically, I 
discuss  the reversal of Platonic geometry carried out by Galileo Galilei and the 
formalisation of Galilean physics achieved by Isaac Newton. In addition, I outline 
the key methodological features of  modern science, which include  indirect 
mathematisation and perfect causality, as well as the role of experimentation in the 
modern scientific project. Theory is central to modern science in its function of 
opening certain regions of things, while delimiting others. Thereby, I discuss how 
theory prescribes what counts as facts for science and experimentation, in advance. 
Finally, I consider the pervasiveness of instrumental reasoning in modern science 
and technology. I conclude with a discussion of the institutional setting of modern 
science and its participation in business, governance, and power relations in these 
domains. ii 
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 1 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I will argue that modern mathematical science has radically 
changed the way we think about the world. We live in an age in which we understand 
the world in techno-scientific terms. Those modes of understanding that do not 
follow the fundamental conceptions of modern science are rejected as illusory. To 
substantiate my overall thesis, I will draw on the insights of phenomenologists that 
continue in the tradition of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, such as Jan 
Patočka, Theodore J. Kisiel, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Alexandre Koyré and Hannah 
Arendt. I also consider and use the thought of scientists who have expressed similar 
ideas about modern science and its dominant role in the contemporary world. 
In what follows, I will use the term modern science to refer to the classical physics 
that started with Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton up until the work of Albert 
Einstein. It is important to acknowledge that at the latter end of the nineteenth 
century and throughout the twentieth century, certain aspects of the theoretical 
position of Newtonian physics have been questioned, but not abandoned, from within 
the discipline of physics. Physicists consider Newtonian physics a borderline case in 
a much broader domain. Hence, my contention is that the  metaphysical 
presuppositions and methodological approaches of the modern scientific outlook 
have not changed from its inception through to the present day. Therefore, I suggest 
that much of the critique offered by the thinkers I will use is relevant to present day 
science. 
To support my overall thesis that modern science has radically changed the way we 
think about the world, I will follow a phenomenological method by presenting 
different ways of considering how we might think about the world in which we live 
and how it is influenced by the modern scientific project. The aim is to show how we 
take scientific presuppositions for granted. 
In chapter one, I discuss a number of the key methodological changes in modern 
mathematical science and its development, while paying attention to the way it 
differs from both the Ancient Greek and medieval conception of the world. In this 2 
short dissertation, I cannot do justice to this rich history, so I will sketch it in very 
broad outlines.
1
I start by outlining the transition from scientific thinking in Ancient Greece through 
to the formalisation of Newtonian physics. I will consider the way early modern 
scientists such as Galileo understand the ideal formulations of geometry inherited 
from Ancient Greek and medieval
 
2
Then, I will survey Husserl’s (1970) account of two key assumptions in the 
methodology of modern science, to elucidate further the change from idealisation in 
Ancient Greece to the formalisation in modern science. These are the assumptions of 
universal causality (in which all events and objects are situated within vast chains of 
cause and effect, each effect becoming a cause for further effects) and indirect 
mathematisation (the process by which qualitative experiences are correlated with 
quantitative determinations).
 thinking. I draw attention to the following key 
difference: For Plato, the abstract shapes of geometry are immaterial, ideal beings. In 
contrast, according to the postulates of early modern science, geometrical shapes are 
no longer in the sphere of ideal forms; rather, we now understand them  as 
constituting the material world. With the advent of formalisation in modern science – 
in which geometrical space is described purely in mathematical terms – there evolves 
an understanding  of the world in which the two Platonic realms (one of ideal, 
unchanging beings and the other of the everyday world of becoming) are collapsed 
into an extensive formal manifold. 
3
In the second chapter, I extend my account of the new scientific methodology by 
unpacking the modern process of experimentation. The modern experiment, I argue, 
is not based simply on observation and a recording of facts (as is commonly claimed) 
but, rather, science and the modern experiment would not be possible without an a 
priori conception that posits the world as an aggregate of forces and processes in 
 
                                                 
1 I acknowledge that there was a large amount of thinking during the medieval period. However, in 
this dissertation I am interested in the fundamental changes that took place in Galilean/Newtonian 
physics and how these changes influenced the modern outlook. A theological reading of Aristotelian 
physics would be an interesting project, but I do not have the space here to go into more detail. It 
would require a more detailed account of the differences between Greek and Christian thinking, as 
well as those aspects of medieval science (for instance, Nominalism) that paved the way for the 
Galilean/Newtonian revolution.  
2 Medieval thought is in many ways an extension of Ancient Greek thinking, transformed through the 
prism of Christianity and a conception of the world with God as the ground of knowledge.  
3 See Husserl, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970. 3 
geometrical space following mathematical laws. The formal scientific system 
demarcates in advance what are scientific facts. A theoretical position is necessary in 
order to organise facts and observations into a science. The formal mathematical 
system constitutes this theoretical position for modern science. 
In chapter three, following the observations about the modern experiment, I will 
examine Heidegger’s (1978) thought on the spirit of technological thinking that 
permeates the modern age.
4
Finally, in the fourth chapter I will make connections between the description of 
modern science (chapters one and two) and the techno-scientific understanding of the 
world (chapter three). This will include an account of the institutional setting of 
science and its relationship with business, governance, and the power relations within 
these domains. In addition, I suggest a more direct link between the methodological 
aspects of modern science and the techno-scientific understanding of the world. I will 
contend that the methodology of modern science presupposes a natural world of 
calculable, measurable and predictable processes. Thus, as calculable, measurable 
and predictable, natural processes become useful and can be located within the 
techno-scientific scheme of utility maximisation.
  Heidegger’s reflections on the spirit of technology 
highlight another aspect of my central thesis that scientific thinking in conjunction 
with technological advances has significantly changed the modern understanding of 
the world. Viewing the world technologically, nature appears as a collection of 
processes and forces that are open to prediction and control. Therefore, as predictable 
and controllable, nature is used for our innumerable projects of material expansion. 
By thinking about the world techno-scientifically, we encourage a relation to the 
world in which we believe we have the right to organise, manipulate and exploit 
nature for our own benefit. 
5
The different emphasis and focus of each chapter provides different aspects that are 
necessary to substantiate my claim that modern science has radically changed the 
way we think about the world in the manner I illustrate throughout my dissertation. 
 
                                                 
4 Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Basic Writings, Ed. David Farrell Krell. 
London: Routledge, 1978a, pp. 217-238. 
5 A more nuanced and detailed discussion is required to differentiate between scientific, technological, 
instrumental and utilitarian reasoning. These different kinds of reasoning are not necessarily 
synonymous, though they do in many ways coincide and overlap each other. Unfortunately, I do not 
have the space to go into these distinctions. Therefore, it may seem that I am not clearly enough 
distinguishing between different aspects of modern thinking. 